If you are old enough to remember the Vietnam War or to have studied it in school, this will sound familiar.

The Fake Narrative 

The political leadership of the United States, President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, wanted to prosecute the Vietnam War with as limited a force as possible. The “military,” knowing that a large force would be necessary, attempted to build the force through incremental, ever increasing troop requests. Ultimately, the never-ending requests and the growing quagmire disillusioned McNamara.

The origin of this narrative can be traced to a book titled The Pentagon Papers. The Secret History of the Vietnam War as Published by the New York Times. This book was not the complete study stolen by Daniel Ellsberg. It included some of the Papers, but four reporters (Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E.W. Kenworth, and Fox Butterfield) took turns explaining to the rest of us what various portions of the Papers meant. The beginning of McNamara’s so-called disillusionment came at the end of 1965. The Times story was that at the end of 1965 U.S. commander General William Westmoreland “suddenly found it necessary to request a vast increase in troops for Phase II of his plan. The General said he would need 154,000 more men.”

The Actual Plan 

Here is the actual account from the complete 12-volume Government Printing Office Pentagon Papers that the above story purports to summarize. By early 1965 the Johnson administration concluded that direct involvement of U.S. ground forces would be necessary to win the war. During the first half of the year the administration worked out a three-phase plan that should result in victory in early 1968. Phase I would raise troop strength to 175,000 by the end of the year. The goal was to “stop losing.” Phase II would add 112,430 troops in the first half of 1966. The mission was to “start winning.” The plan was based on intelligence estimates of the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam. We would start winning when we hit the “crossover point,” the point at which we were killing enemy soldiers faster than they could be replaced. There would be additional forces in Phase III, but those numbers were not yet worked out. The rate of deployment was limited by logistic constraints. This was about as fast as our capabilities would allow. There is no evidence of civilian-military disagreement.

There was nothing incremental about the plan. The plan was to deploy from mid-1965 to mid-1966 almost 300,000 troops. Phase I was launched and troop strength neared 180,000 by year’s end. The level of killing was “better” than McNamara anticipated.

The Problem 

However, in late November intelligence concluded that the number of North Vietnamese soldiers had increased between July and November from 48,550 to 63,550 despite the “positive” level of killing. Earlier estimates of infiltration rates had been wrong.

 McNamara was at a NATO defense ministers meeting when he received the new intelligence estimate. Instead of returning to Washington he decided to go to Vietnam to consult with Westmoreland. He cabled Westmoreland to be prepared to discuss the new intelligence and to give his recommendation for an increase to the Phase II 112,430 planned troop deployment. His cable said “Will it not be necessary to add one or two divisions to the 28 battalions proposed in order to provide forces in the Delta?” Weeks earlier McNamara had already proposed and Johnson had approved going ahead with the Phase II 112,430 deployment.

The Solution -- Two Explanations 

When McNamara met with Westmoreland, the general recommended a 41,500 troop addition to the planned 112,430 deployment. But the New York Times book said that Westmoreland “suddenly” requested a “vast” increase of 154,000. Two different explanations. How can that be?

Recall that 112,430 had already been approved, but had not yet deployed. The recommendation to add 41,500 responded to McNamara’s guidance “Will it not be necessary to add a division or two.” If you add 41,500 to 112,430 you get 153,930 or about 154,000, which is what the New York Times did. It was literally true that Westmoreland’s recommendation would ultimately result in 154,000 more troops from that point in time, but the Times explanation obscures the real story.

There was nothing sudden about Westmoreland’s response to McNamara’s demand for a recommendation to plus up Phase II. The original plan called for a total force of nearly 300,000 by mid-1966. Westmoreland’s actual recommendation of 41,500 is not a “vast” increase. The number 154,000 is at best misleading and the words “suddenly” and “vast” are lies. There is no way the Times explanation was accidental or a difference of opinion. It was carefully crafted and intended to help build the narrative that most accepted. I accepted it until I got into my own research.

Is there any way to consider the Times explanation fair or accurate? No, but you can’t challenge it with a sound bite. You have to go through the documents in detail, which is difficult in a short attention span era. And so the fake narrative stuck, in no small measure because of the Times book.

If you want to know how I know all this, read chapter 7 of my book Vietnam: Strategy for a Stalemate.

Image: U.S. Army

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